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Abstract: This paper analyses the extent to which tax-benefit systems provide an automatic 
stabilisation of income for those who became unemployed at the onset of the Great 
Recession. The focus of the analysis is on the compensation for earnings lost due to 
unemployment which is channelled through the welfare systems to this group of people who 
are clearly vulnerable to the   recession’s adverse effects. In order to assess the impact of 
unemployment on household income, counterfactual scenarios are simulated by using 
EUROMOD, the EU-wide microsimulation model, integrated with information from the EU-
LFS data. This paper provides evidence on the differing degrees of relative and absolute 
resilience of the household incomes of the new unemployed. These arise from the variations 
in the protection offered by the national tax-benefit systems and from the personal and 
household circumstances of those most recently at risk of unemployment in the countries 
considered. 
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1. Introduction  
The financial crisis of 2008 has lead to the most serious economic downturn since the Second 
World War. The European economies shrank by 5.3% between the second quarter of 2008 
and the same quarter of 2009. Because of the size of such an economic slowdown, originated 
in the United States and then propagated to the rest of the world, many refer to this period as 
the Great Recession (Arpaia and Curci, 2010). 
Although the EU unemployment rate increased only to a limited extent (from 6.9% in the 
second quarter of 2008 to 8.9% in the same quarter of 2009) when compared to the 
contraction in GDP, the impact of the Great Recession on labour markets has, since then, 
been intense and its effects seem likely to last longer than the time taken for GDP to recover. 
Projections suggest that the unemployment rate in the European Union will stay above 10% 
until the end of 2013, a level considerably higher than the pre-crisis rate (European 
Commission, 2012). Moreover, the number of long term unemployed, defined as those in 
unemployment longer than one year, increased by nearly 10% between the second quarter of 
2008 and the same quarter of 2009, reaching 6.7 million people. Over the following years the 
number of long term unemployed has continued to rise, reaching 9 million in the second 
quarter of 2010 and nearly touching 11 million in the same quarter of 2012. Considering also 
the large proportion of those who lost their job at the onset of the Great Recession who are 
still out of the labour market, long term unemployment and its consequences on individual 
well being will be a challenge for the near future (European Commission, 2010). 
The picture described above, as well as the lessons of previous recessions, suggest that the 
Great Recession will overshadow European economies for years to come, through legacies 
such as unemployment and public debt (Keeley and Love, 2010), and with long-lasting 
impacts on household incomes (Jenkins et al., 2013). 
The effects of the Great Recession at its onset have varied across EU countries with a 
decrease in GDP ranging from 3 to 4 percent in Greece, Portugal and France, 4 to 6 percent in 
Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Germany and Italy and more than 15% in Estonia and other 
Baltic states. Moreover, there has been a high degree of heterogeneity in the response of 
labour markets to the negative shocks in GDP (OECD, 2010). Some countries (i.e. the Baltic 
States, Ireland, and above all Spain) experienced a large increase in unemployment relative to 
the fall in GDP. For others (i.e. Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and above all Germany) the 
opposite has been the case1. It is clear that the elasticity of employment to GDP decline is 
hugely differentiated across countries due to i) specific employment policies which mitigated 
the effects of the crisis on the overall employment (e.g. internal flexibility through short-time 
working arrangements, temporary partial unemployment and temporary closures) as opposed 
to the relatively high share of workers in temporary contracts who have been relatively easily 
dismissed, ii) a different timing effect due to the productive structure of the country (with 
national economies depending to a larger extent on the construction sector affected more 
                                                 
1 A 1% reduction in real GDP between the second quarter of 2008 and the same quarter of 2009 is associated 
with an  increase in the unemployment rate of about 11% in Estonia (0.57 ppt), 16% in Spain (1.70 ppt) and 
23%  in Ireland (1.26 ppt). The same indicator amounts to about 4% in Belgium (0.26 ppt) and Netherlands 
(0.11 ppt), to just above 1.5% in Italy (0.11ppt) while no discernible variation has been reported in the German 
unemployment rate between the second quarters of 2008 and 2009 despite a real GDP reduction of 6.2%. For 
France and Portugal the indicator is close to 7% (respectively 0.49 and 0.54 ppt), while for the UK it is just 
below 8.5% (0.44 ppt). 
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immediately) and iii) other symptoms of the recession such as a decline in overall labour 
productivity, a reduction in earnings or increased rates of early retirement (European 
Commission, 2010). 
Nevertheless, unemployment is one of the most important consequences of the Great 
Recession (Keeley and Love, 2010), at least in terms of direct impact on the economic well-
being of individuals who lose their jobs, as well as that of their families. In addition to 
reducing income levels,   unemployment   increases   citizen’s   economic   insecurity,   which  
Osberg (1998) defines as the anxiety produced by the lack of economic safety. Such an 
increase in economic insecurity is of great concern given its immediate and long-term effects 
not only for those individuals experiencing unemployment but also for employed individuals, 
who would change their current behaviour due to the increase in the likelihood of a future job 
loss.  
Welfare states, however, prevent or insure against economic insecurity, so the aim of this 
paper is to understand, in a cross-country perspective, the extent to which tax-benefit systems 
provide an automatic income stabilisation for those who became unemployed at the onset of 
the Great Recession. In particular, we aim to measure the amount of income insurance that 
individuals and their households receive from the Welfare State against the hazard of the 
Great Recession. In doing so we restrict our attention to one of the primary channels of 
propagation of adverse effects of recession onto the living standards of the most vulnerable: 
the loss of a job. We refrain from considering other aspects such as a reduction in hours 
worked for those with a job or a contraction in the hourly wage for those with flexible 
contracts. The consequences of the crisis on the most vulnerable individuals depend on their 
individual characteristics and the interaction between their labour market participation, their 
living arrangements and the capacity of the tax and benefit systems to absorb macro-
economic shocks.  
Dolls et al. (2012) show that the automatic stabilizers differ greatly across countries in 
particular in the case of asymmetric unemployment shocks, assuming that those already in 
unemployment at the time of the survey data collection (who may have already exhausted 
their Unemployment Benefits) can be representative of the individuals who lose their job at 
the onset of the Great Recession. For the first time in a comparable cross-country perspective, 
we characterise in a more precise way those who became unemployed at the onset of the 
Great Recession (Jenkins et al., 2013) and analyse the effectiveness of the tax-benefit systems 
in cushioning the income loss in the short and long term.  
Lack of longitudinal up-to-date information on household income and labour market 
circumstances, usually available only few years after the beginning of the unemployment 
spell and in a restricted number of countries, constrains the possibilities for empirical 
analysis. To address this limitation, we assess the impact of the unemployment on household 
income by means of simulating counterfactual scenarios by using a fiscal microsimulation 
approach (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006) which allows us to estimate the household 
incomes of individuals who lose their job, considering the direct cushioning effect of the tax-
benefit systems and the way they depend on the remaining household market income and 
personal/household characteristics. The use of tax-benefit microsimulation models to 
consider how the welfare systems protect people from an extreme shock has become known 
as “stress  test”  of the tax-benefit system (Atkinson, 2009) and increasingly applied to analyse 
the consequences of the Great Recession (Figari et al., 2011, Jenkins et al., 2013).  
We highlight the main motivations to exploit such an approach in section 2. In section 3 we 
introduce EUROMOD, the EU-wide tax-benefit model, used in the analysis to derive 
disposable income in the counterfactual scenarios. Moreover, we present the statistical 
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matching procedure used to identify those who became unemployed using information from 
the EU Labour Force Survey, which covers the transitions to unemployment between 2008 
and 2009. Finally, we describe the indicators we apply to capture the resilience of the welfare 
system in both relative and absolute terms.  
The paper focuses on a set of six countries of the European Union which allow us to consider 
a large variety of circumstances: Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK. 
These countries experienced different macroeconomic changes during the first phase of Great 
Recession, with large unemployment increases in Estonia, Spain and the UK (the latter two 
countries accounting for most of the increase in unemployment at EU level between 2008 and 
2009) and relatively moderate increases in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. Moreover, 
these countries have different unemployment protection schemes (and, generally, welfare 
systems), ranging from a flat scheme in the UK to generous earnings related schemes in 
Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands. The most relevant features of the unemployment 
protection systems of the countries included in the analysis are described in section 4. 
Cross country evidence of the different aspects of the automatic income stabilisation offered 
by the tax-benefit systems is presented in section 5, showing the differing degrees to which 
unemployment has the potential to reduce household incomes, and the extent of resilience of 
those incomes due to the protection offered by the tax-benefit systems, the household 
situation of the unemployed person, and across countries. Section 6 concludes, summarising 
the main findings and suggesting some research developments for the future.  
 
2. “Stress testing” the tax-benefit systems: motivations and approach 
Why do we need to stress test the tax-benefit systems? And what do we mean exactly by a 
stress test?   
In a period of economic downturn, with direct consequences for the labour market 
participation of individuals, coupled with necessary fiscal consolidation in most European 
countries, it is necessary to understand how contemporary tax-benefit systems react to 
changes in individual circumstances. And, more importantly, it is necessary to assess the 
extent to which household incomes are protected by the tax-benefit systems. 
The stress test approach is common in financial institutions to test the sensitivity of a portfolio to a set of extreme but plausible shocks and to assess the significance of the 
system’s	  vulnerabilities	  (Jones et al., 2004). Atkinson (2009) has suggested extending the same approach to tax-benefit systems in order to predict the cushioning effects of the 
social protection schemes in the event of a loss of market incomes and to assess the overall 
income stabilisation after a macroeconomic shock. 
By using a fiscal microsimulation approach which combines detailed survey data on market 
incomes and household characteristics and tax-benefit rules (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 
2006), we can determine the different components of household disposable income under 
different counterfactual scenarios in which, as a consequence of a macro-economic shock, we 
assume that a given number of individuals lose their job. Microsimulation models are 
valuable tools to determine the distributional effects of changing household characteristics 
and labour market participation. A more systematic use in disentangling the consequences of 
the Great Recession is particularly appropriate (Jenkins et al., 2013).   
The simulated household disposable income of the individuals depends on the cushioning 
effect of contributory and means-tested benefits for the unemployed (if entitled), the effects 
of other means-tested benefits and tax credits designed to protect families on low income, and 
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on other household incomes, in the form of earnings of those still in work as well as pensions 
and benefits, received by other household members. The outcomes depend on whether the 
unemployed person is entitled to Unemployment Benefit or not, and will vary in the short 
term and in the longer term when entitlement to Unemployment Benefit is typically 
exhausted. In order to assess the robustness of our measures of the resilience of the welfare 
systems we consider different scenarios in these respects. 
By using a tax-benefit model which is based on micro data representative of the national 
population, the stress test exercise uses as a benchmark the real income distribution observed 
at a given time. Moreover, the pattern of income changes depends on the presence of other 
incomes, the household characteristics, and the interaction between the different tax-benefits 
instruments. In doing so our work enriches the perspective offered by model family 
calculations (OECD, 2007, 2011b), by characterizing in an informed and detailed way who 
became unemployed, considering their household circumstances and their position in the 
income distribution. 
A stress test exercise can provide evidence of the effects of either a hypothetical macro-
economic shock or a contemporary shock for which survey data covering the period of 
interest are not yet available. The latter option is the one we follow to assess the variation in 
social impact of an increase in unemployment during the Great Recession across countries 
and social protection systems. In due course, survey data collected over the period of the 
Great Recession will provide evidence of the evolution of the income distribution and 
analysis of longitudinal data will show us how incomes changed for those directly affected 
due to unemployment (Jenkins et al., 2013). However it is important to assess the social 
impact of specific aspects of the crisis and to inform the policy debate in a timely fashion 
(OECD, 2011a). Although the EU economy has started to recover there are risks of recession 
returning, the labour market has not yet recovered (European Commission, 2010) and it is 
necessary to monitor the social impact of the current situation.    
Moreover, the stress test approach allows us to focus on a specific aspect of a macroeconomic 
shock, highlighting the direct compensation provided by tax-benefit systems rather than that 
arising from other adaptive changes in individual behaviours. In this paper we focus 
exclusively on the increase in unemployment as one of the channels through which the Great 
Recession   affects   directly   individuals’  well-being. As stressed by Jenkins et al. (2013) the 
short term consequences of the Great Recession on the inequality of the income distribution 
might be negligible, and there could be differential and potentially offsetting effects for 
different groups in the population. The social indicators usually used, such as the indicator of 
relative poverty, might have serious difficulties in capturing these effects on social exclusion 
(Nolan, 2009). The overall effect of the Great Recession on the income distribution is likely 
to be affected by general equilibrium consequences and other behavioural responses. 
Previous recessions suggest that the evolution in the overall income distribution can hide the 
changes in income of particular groups at risk who suffered the direct consequences of the 
crisis (Aaberge et al., 2000). However, individuals and households directly affected by 
unemployment suffer to a large extent and it is important to assess the extent to which the 
welfare system helps to stabilise their income and whether there are specific weaknesses in 
the policy instruments in operation. 
Even if current income falls for only the individuals affected by an unemployment shock, 
economic insecurity, which depends on current wealth, past experience and future expected 
outcomes (Bossert   and   D’Ambrosio, 2009), increases for all households. Whenever the 
unemployment rate increases and the government fails to provide a sufficient level of 
unemployment insurance, employed individuals have higher expectations of a job loss and of 
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a future drop in income. Economic insecurity, hence, increases with unemployment level and 
should be taken into account in measuring wellbeing (Osberg and Sharpe 2002, 2005). 
Individual preferences for consumption smoothing lead, for instance, to a decrease in current 
consumption in the presence of economic insecurity. Consequently, the overall effects of the 
crisis would be exacerbated if the government does not provide an income stabilisation for 
those who actually experience unemployment. 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1. Counterfactual scenarios derived using EUROMOD  
We exploit the potential of the microsimulation techniques to define two different 
counterfactual scenarios, based on survey data representative of the national population 
before the onset of the economic downturn, in which we simulate the transition from 
employment to unemployment as observed between 2008 and 2009. 
To enable a cross-country perspective, we use EUROMOD, the EU-wide tax-benefit 
microsimulation model. EUROMOD simulates tax liabilities (direct tax and social insurance 
contributions) and benefit entitlements for the household populations of EU Member States in 
a comparable way across countries on the basis of the tax-benefit rules in place and 
information available in the underlying datasets. The components of the tax-benefit systems 
which are not simulated (e.g. old age pensions) are taken from the data, along with 
information on original incomes. The simulation of the Unemployment Benefits is based on 
reported earnings, where relevant, and under assumptions about contributions made in the 
past derived from the limited information available in the data. See Sutherland (2007) for 
further information.  
The underlying micro data come from the 2007 EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC)2 with the exception of the UK component which is based on the 
national 2008/09 Family Resources Survey. The analysis in this paper is based on the tax-
benefit rules in place in 2009 (as of June 30th). Monetary values of non-simulated income 
components referring to 2006 have been updated to 2009 according to actual changes in 
prices and incomes over the relevant period.3 No adjustment is made for changes in 
population composition between 2007 and 2009.  
In the first scenario, representing the short term, we analyze the situation of the new 
unemployed distinguishing between those entitled and not entitled to receive contributory 
Unemployment Benefits. In the second scenario, characterising the effects in the long term, 
we assume that eligibility for contributory Unemployment Benefits is exhausted for all new 
unemployed. In both scenarios, we compute household disposable income, taking account of 
the operation of the whole tax-benefit system, allowing individuals and their households to 
receive additional income-tested benefits (e.g. housing benefits, social assistance, in-work 
benefits and other means-tested support) and to pay reduced income tax and social 
contributions given the low level of earnings.  
In both scenarios we aim to highlight the amount of insurance coverage guaranteed directly 
by government, independently of any potential change in the behaviour of family members 
which could occur in the short or long term. For this reason, we assume zero cross elasticity 
of labour supply of other family members, and we do not take account of any non take-up of 
                                                 
2 In case of Belgium, Estonia, and Italy the national version of the EU-SILC has been used because it includes 
more variables at the necessary level of detail.  
3 This process is documented in EUROMOD Country Reports.  
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benefits or tax evasion.4 It is generally assumed that the legal rules are universally respected 
and that the costs of compliance are zero.  
Moreover, household disposable income, after becoming unemployed, is calculated as a 
monthly average over a 12 months period assuming the person is unemployed for the number 
of months spent in work in the year before the unemployment shock, rather than taking into 
account the variation in durations of individual unemployment spells. In this way we can 
isolate the overall effectiveness of the tax-benefit systems without needing to consider what 
earnings would be on re-entry into work. Our results can be interpreted as measuring the 
intended amount of insurance coverage embedded in the tax-benefit systems.  
 
3.2. The characteristics of the new unemployed at the onset of the Great Recession 
The analysis focuses on employed and self-employed individuals who lost their job at the 
onset of the Great Recession. We identify the individuals who are unemployed in the year 
2009 but employed in the previous year (thereafter  we  refer  to  them  as  “new  unemployed”)  
using the retrospective information included in the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). The 
EU-LFS is a continuous household survey conducted on a representative sample of 
individuals (between 0.2% and 3.3% of the population) aged 15 and over from all countries 
of the European Union, 3 countries of the European Free Trade Association and 3 Candidate 
countries. National statistical institutes collect comparable information on current 
employment status and characteristics, employment history, and individual and household 
characteristics that Eurostat releases on quarterly and annual basis.5 
Due to labour market specificities and the channels through which the Great Recession has 
impacted on each national economy, the risk of unemployment does not affect all workers 
equally. In order to assess correctly the income stabilisation offered by the welfare systems to 
the new unemployed it is necessary to identify them precisely, taking into account the most 
important characteristics associated with the transition into unemployment.  
The individuals currently employed in the EUROMOD underlying microdata are those 
potentially at risk of becoming unemployed. In order match the observations in the EU-LFS 
data and EUROMOD data, we perform a Coarsened Exact Matching procedure (Iacus et al., 
2011) based on individual characteristics (gender, age, education level), previous job 
characteristics (self employment, sector of activity) and household characteristics (number of 
adults, presence of children, number of earners, presence of other new unemployed in the 
same household).6  
                                                 
4However, given the incidence of the shadow economy in Italy, gross self-employed income has been calibrated 
in  order  to  obtain  an  aggregate  amount  corresponding  to  that  reported  in  fiscal  data  (Fiorio  and  D’Amuri,  2006). 
5For more information refer to the EU-LFS webpage 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/lfs 
6 The basic idea of the Coarsened Exact Matching is to i) coarsen each observed characteristic into meaningful 
groups, ii) apply exact matching to the coarsened data which involves sorting the observations into strata and 
then iii) retain the original value of the observed characteristic. Such a matching method resembles the exact 
matching without restricting the match only to units with exactly the same observed values. The Coarsened 
Exact Matching procedure weights the matched observations of the control group in the EUROMOD input data 
according to the size of their strata and the survey weights from the EU-LFS data. In order to narrow the 
matching to the treated observations (in EU-LFS data) for which control units (in EUROMOD data) have been 
properly identified, we discard strata with only treated units. Given the choice of the characteristics on which the 
matching is based, their number is small, ranging across countries between 1% and 7% of the original 
observations, at the cost of higher overall imbalance. 
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The use of the Coarsened Exact Matching guarantees the same multivariate empirical 
distribution of the individual characteristics observed in the EU LFS and matched in the 
EUROMOD input data, which is essential for the subsequent analysis of the resilience of the 
welfare state given that eligibility for Unemployment Benefits depends on most of these 
characteristics (e.g. age, self employment status, and household characteristics) jointly 
considered.7 
We apply the Coarsened Exact Matching procedure in a sequential way. In the first step, we 
only consider one new unemployed individual per household and we match the observations 
in the treated and control data. In the second step, we match the second unemployed 
individual per household (if there is one) on the sub-sample of households in the control data 
which contains one unit already matched in the first step. Such a procedure allows us to 
identify the same proportion of households with more than one new unemployed member in 
the final EUROMOD dataset as observed in the EU-LFS data.  
The marginal distributions of the characteristics of the new unemployed identified in 
EUROMOD data as a result of the statistical matching procedure are reported in Table 1. A t-
test for equality of means in the control and in the treated group is carried out and it fails to 
reject the null hypothesis for most of the observed characteristics included in the matching.  
The new unemployed are predominantly male (in particular in the UK where 68% of the new 
unemployed are men). On the one hand, in Belgium, Spain, the Netherland, and the UK they 
are younger than in other countries; on the other hand in Belgium, Spain and Italy those 
closer to the retirement age are less affected by unemployment. Among the new unemployed, 
the majority has a low level of education in Spain and the UK, while more than one quarter 
has received tertiary education in Belgium, Estonia and the Netherlands. Across countries, 
the large majority of new unemployed are employees (with a notable share of self-employed 
in Italy) and working in the service sector (with the exception of Estonia). 
The remainder of Table 1 reports some household characteristics of the new unemployed: 
most of them come from non-single households (in particular in Estonia, Spain and Italy) and 
about 40% of them have at least one child in their household. The new unemployed come 
from households where there are two or more earners in 70% of the cases in Estonia and 
Spain, 60% in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK and only 50% in Belgium. Moreover 
approximately 15% of the new unemployed in Estonia and Spain come from households with 
more than one such person, with lower shares in the other countries.  
<TABLE 1 AROUND HERE> 
Table 2 reports additional income information on the new unemployed derived from 
EUROMOD data given that such information is not available in the EU-LFS database. The 
distribution of the new unemployed by household income quintile groups (assessed before the 
unemployment) shows an inverted U-shape in Belgium, Estonia, Spain and Italy while in the 
Netherlands and the UK the new unemployed come predominantly from the middle and the 
upper part of the income distribution.    
<TABLE 2 AROUND HERE> 
 
                                                 
7 Iacus et al. (2011) proposed a comprehensive measure of global imbalance (L1) which must be used as a point 
of comparison between the matching solution and the baseline unmatched data, showing that a good matching 
reduces the overall L1. In our case, the statistic L1 reduces by around 7% in BE, IT, NL, and the UK, 10% in ES 
and 19% in EE which is satisfactory given the quite restrictive choice of characteristics on which the matching 
is based and the relatively small numbers of treated observation discarded. 
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3.3. Income stabilisation indicators  
Our analysis of the automatic income stabilisation effect across European countries focuses 
on both relative and absolute resilience provided by the welfare state, taking into account the 
interactions of the tax-benefit policies with other existing household income and household 
composition.  
First, in order to assess the level of stabilisation of incomes relative to the pre-shock baseline, 
we  employ  the  Net  Replacement  Rate  (Immervoll  and  O’Donoghue,  2004)  which  is  the  ratio  
between household disposable income after and before the unemployment shock. It gives  an 
indication of the extent of the remaining disposable income for those affected by the 
unemployment shock: 
Net  Replacement  Rate =
Y୮୭ୱ୲
Y୮୰ୣ
 
where Y is Household Disposable income made up of Original Income plus Benefits, minus 
Taxes.  
In addition to any form of market income, Original Income includes other sources of personal 
income as well, such as private inter-household transfers and alimonies. Even in the scenarios 
where we simulate the unemployment shock, household original income may be positive due 
to income from savings, private pensions, inter-household transfers or the earnings of other 
household members. Income from savings could be seen as another channel of self-insurance 
but given the poor quality of the underlying data we treat them as one of the components of 
Original Income without highlighting their specific role.  
In order to analyse the channels through which relative resilience is transmitted, we 
decompose the Net Replacement Rate by income source:  
Net  Replacement  Rate =
O୮୭ୱ୲ + B୮୭ୱ୲ − T୮୭ୱ୲
Y୮୰ୣ
 
where O is the Original Income, B is the sum of Benefits and T includes Income Taxes and 
Social Insurance Contributions paid by employees and the self employed. 
Benefits are made of i) Unemployment Benefits (both Insurance and Assistance schemes), ii) 
Social Assistance Benefits (including minimum income schemes, housing benefits and 
residual social assistance benefits), iii) Family Benefits (including allowances due to the 
presence of children in the household and different types of means-tested benefits such as the 
Working Tax Credit in the UK) and iv) Pension & Disability Benefits, including contributory 
old-age and survivors pensions, early retirement benefits, disability and invalidity benefits.  
Moreover, in order to measure the extent of protection offered by public support, we 
introduce a new indicator, namely the Compensation Rate which measures the proportion of 
net earnings lost due to unemployment, compensated by public transfers net of taxes: 
Compensation  Rate=
൫Bpost-­‐Bpre൯-­‐ ቀT(୉ഥpost)  -­‐T(୉ഥpre)ቁ
      ቀEpre-­‐T(Epre)ቁ -­‐ ቀEpost-­‐T(Epost)ቁ     
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where the difference in the net earnings before and after the shock represents the income lost 
due to the unemployment, which is compensated by more generous net benefits. To derive 
net measures, taxes are allocated proportionally to each income source.8 
This new indicator allows us to isolate the net public support from the effect of other earnings 
present in the household of a new unemployed individual, which usually play an important 
role in determining the income after the unemployment shock. The compensation rate gives 
us a direct indication of the net public contribution as proportion of the net market income 
lost due to the unemployment shock. Furthermore, we decompose the compensation rate in 
the same way as the Net Replacement Rate to highlight the contribution of each group of 
benefits. 
In order to test whether the income stabilisation offered by the tax-benefit systems prevents 
the new unemployed from falling below an absolute income threshold, we compare the 
equivalised disposable income before and after the unemployment shock to the poverty 
threshold at 60% of the median in the pre-shock baseline. In this way we distinguish the new 
unemployed  who  are  poor  already  before   the  unemployment  shock   (“Poor   in  work”),   those  
falling below the threshold as  a  result  of  the  shock  (“At  risk”)  and  those  remaining  above  it in 
spite  of  the  shock  (“Protected”).   
Our approach is equivalent to calculating absolute poverty rates with a fixed poverty line and 
resembles the suggested practice in the measurement of poverty during a recession of using a 
threshold fixed in real terms (Jenkins et al., 2013). Such an indicator can be considered as an 
appropriate proxy for the experience of impoverishment that a newly unemployed person 
faces, comparing his/her current condition with his/her own status before the unemployment 
shock (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2011). 
A discussion of the issues related to effects of Unemployment Benefits and their generosity 
on employment and a normative judgment of the proper level of protection provided by the 
welfare systems is beyond the scope of this paper. In the labour economics literature, there is 
a lot of evidence about the disincentive effects of Unemployment Benefits with high 
replacement rates (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991) but also about the positive effects of 
Unemployment Benefits on subsequent employment stability (Tatsiramos, 2009). 
Furthermore, the trade off between the adequacy and the disincentive effect of 
Unemployment Benefits needs to be evaluated considering the minimum levels of living 
standards guaranteed by the welfare system as a whole  (Boadway and Keen, 2000). 
Nevertheless, in an economically efficient system low firing costs, flexible contracts, and 
training opportunities are coupled with generous unemployment subsidies (Alesina and 
Giavazzi, 2006). Given the policy goal of reducing the numbers of individuals at risk of 
poverty, it is implicit that household income of the new unemployed should not fall below the 
poverty threshold. Although we do not provide a normative judgement on the level of 
protection, our indicators allow us to disentangle the consequences of the Great Recession 
faced by those who are suffering from unemployment and are potentially among the 
individuals most vulnerable to the effects of the recession. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8   stands for taxes on income other than earnings. Original incomes other than earnings do not change before 
and after the unemployment shock and the difference is, hence, zero. This is the reason why they are not 
included in the formula. 
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4. Unemployment protection schemes around Europe  
The existence in all European countries of a developed welfare state (Schubert et al., 2009), 
that is intended, among other things, to protect people and their families against economic 
shocks, is one of the main differences between the crisis faced today and that which occurred 
in the 1930s. However, the European countries included in our study have welfare systems 
that differ considerably and as a consequence the degree of protection offered to the 
unemployed differs (Bertola et al., 2001).  
Anglo-Saxon systems, as in the UK, are targeted at low-income individuals and have social 
assistance schemes with benefit levels that are generous relative to those for similar benefits 
in other countries, but offer low levels of Unemployment Insurance benefits. Conversely, 
Scandinavian and Continental systems (Belgium and the Netherlands) have a Bismarkian 
tradition of contribution-financed Unemployment Benefits, with social assistance schemes 
that operate as a final safety net. In addition, the more recently developed Southern systems 
(Italy and Spain) offer generally lower levels of expenditure in social protection and higher 
reliance on family support. Spain, however, provides high unemployment and regional social 
assistance benefits resembling Continental countries (Bonoli, 1997). Finally, Eastern 
European welfare systems differ considerably from one another: Soviet-Union heritage, the 
later implementation of a liberal ideology together with Scandinavian influences shape the 
Estonian welfare system, where Unemployment Insurance was introduced only in 2003 
(Trumm and Ainsaar, 2009).  
Generally, individuals that become unemployed might be eligible for Unemployment 
Insurance and Unemployment Assistance schemes. In addition, general Social Assistance 
schemes might be targeted at low-income individuals or households, guaranteeing a 
minimum level of income. 
Unemployment insurance is generally an earnings related benefit (except in the UK where it 
is a flat rate benefit) based on contribution history. Unemployment assistance complements 
the unemployment insurance once it is exhausted or gives economic support to the 
unemployed that do not meet the requirements of the insurance benefit. Whilst every country 
provides Unemployment insurance, Unemployment assistance is not always available. 
A description of the singularities of the unemployment protection schemes and Social 
Assistance of the countries included in our paper is presented in Table 3. Belgium, Spain and 
the Netherlands offer the most generous unemployment insurance and for the longest period 
of time (with an initial replacement rate of 60% with no time limit in Belgium and a 
replacement rate of 70% in the Netherlands and Spain for a maximum of 24 and 38 months, 
respectively). Estonia and Italy9 provide lower replacement rates (between 60% and 40%) 
with a time limit of 9 and 8 months, respectively. The UK provides the least generous 
Unemployment Insurance scheme (with a flat payment between €  60 and €  76 per week for a 
maximum of 6 months). Unemployment insurance schemes are subject to income tax and 
social contributions (with the exception of Belgium and the UK) paid mostly by the social 
security agency and only a residual part by the unemployed.  
Unemployment assistance is an income-based benefit, means tested in the UK and the 
Netherlands and provided at a flat rate in Estonia and Spain. Italy and Belgium do not 
                                                 
9 In Italy, wage supplementation schemes (i.e. Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) provide an additional 
compensation for reduced hours of work. However, people brought onto wage supplementation schemes do not 
count as unemployed in the official statistics and it is not possible to identify them in our data. In the 
simulations, we consider only those losing their jobs and not those retaining any wages and reducing hours of 
work. 
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provide Unemployment assistance. In the Netherlands, it merely acts as a top up to the 
Unemployment insurance, providing that the later is lower than the Social Assistance. 
Eligibility in Estonia and Spain is dependent on contributions while in the UK no 
contributions are required. It is unlimited in the UK (providing the unemployed person is job 
seeking) while it has a maximum duration of 18 months in Spain and 9 (or 14 if close to 
retirement) in Estonia. 
While Unemployment insurance and Unemployment assistance are targeted at the 
unemployed, Social Assistance benefits in principle provide a guaranteed minimum level of 
income which is independent of employment status (although able bodied working age 
people are usually expected to be available for work). Every country except Italy offers 
means-tested time-unlimited payments and the amount of the benefit varies considerably 
between countries. Social Assistance schemes can act as efficient social shock absorbers so 
long as the minimum income guarantee is sufficiently generous. However, a significant 
number of individuals are ineligible for Social Assistance and, anyway, a large fraction of 
those entitled to it remain at very low levels of income even including Social Assistance 
(Figari et al., 2013).    
<TABLE 3 AROUND HERE> 
The disparities in the unemployment protection systems are also reflected in the different 
coverage rate of the Unemployment Benefits, measured as the proportion of new unemployed 
entitled to receive Unemployment Benefits. Unfortunately, information on the number of new 
benefit recipients is rarely available and not comparable across countries, and further 
difficulties in obtaining yearly estimates arise from the duration of both entitlements to 
benefits and unemployment spells.10 The only information available in a cross country 
perspective is provided by the OECD (2011b) which reports the change in benefit recipients 
as a percentage of the change in unemployed individuals between the first year after and the 
year prior the onset of the crisis.11 Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom show a considerably high proportion of new unemployed receiving Unemployment 
Benefits (73%, 76%, 87% and 84%, respectively) while the proportion of new unemployed 
receiving Unemployment Benefits is around 52% in Spain and 42% in Italy.12 These figures 
highlight the importance of considering the different level of welfare resilience faced by 
those entitled and not entitled to Unemployment Benefits, revealing that the lack of coverage 
is a gap in the protection system notwithstanding the average degree of protection offered to 
those entitled to Unemployment Benefits.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The EU-LFS collects information on unemployment office registration but not necessarily on benefit 
recipients.  
11 The onset of the crises varies from one country to another. The main drawback of this measure is that it might 
not accurately represent the proportion of new unemployed entitled to receive Unemployment Benefits. On the 
one hand, the reported change in benefit recipients is lower than the actual number of new benefit recipients if 
those who became unemployed before the onset of the crisis exhausted their entitlement to unemployment 
benefits. On the other hand, the reported change in the number of unemployed is lower than the actual number 
of new unemployed if those unemployed before the onset of the crisis found a job (OECD, 2011b). 
12 For comparability reasons and to avoid disparities due to differences in the period covered, Estonian figures 
are from the EUROMOD Country Report: Estonia 2006-2009. 
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5. Empirical evidence 
5.1. Relative resilience  
The average Net Replacement Rates, shown in Table 4, are illustrative of the cross country 
variation in the relative resilience due to differences in tax-benefit systems, characteristics of 
the new unemployed and household composition. 
In the short term, the household income of those entitled to Unemployment Benefits on 
average falls to as much as 81% of its pre-unemployment level in Belgium and the 
corresponding figures are also relatively high in Spain (77%) and the Netherlands (72%). The 
average Net Replacement Rate is lower, around 65%, in Estonia and Italy, while in the UK it 
is just 57%.  
<TABLE 4 AROUND HERE> 
However, these averages can obscure differences in the distribution of Net Replacement 
Rates which reveal the extent of variation in income replacement across the countries 
considered. The kernel density functions presented in Figure 1 illustrate these differences. 
Countries with higher Net Replacement Rates (Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands) show 
higher concentrations of new unemployed around the mode, in part due to the minimum 
payments and upper ceilings of the earnings related Unemployment Benefits. The minimum 
payments result in Net Replacement Rates which do not fall below a lower limit (around 30-
40%) but also being larger than 100% in some cases (in particular in Belgium). The 
dispersion of the Net Replacement Rates is much larger in Estonia, Italy and in particular in 
the UK, with substantial shares of new unemployed facing a very low Net Replacement Rate. 
The clear bimodal pattern observed in Estonia, Spain and Italy is due to the concentration of 
new unemployed around those modal values depending on whether they live in sole earner 
households or not. 
<FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE> 
In Estonia, Spain, Netherlands and the UK those not entitled to Unemployment Benefits on 
average have a higher Net Replacement Rate than those entitled to the benefits (Table 4). 
There are two explanations for a higher relative resilience in spite of the lack of receipt of 
Unemployment Benefits. First, there is a compositional effect. Those not entitled to the 
benefits are less attached to the labour market (being mainly youths and women in couples 
with a greater likelihood of short contribution histories) and hence contribute less to the 
household income before the unemployment shock. This is confirmed by the greater 
importance of original incomes and pensions as a proportion of pre-shock disposable income 
(Figure 3). Secondly there is, a compensation effect due to other benefits (as shown by the 
greater relevance of Social Assistance and Family Benefits in Figure 3) received by those not 
entitled to Unemployment Benefits which compensate at least in part for the loss of earnings. 
As expected, this compensation effect is not apparent in Italy due to the lack of income based 
safety nets and only partially in Belgium due to the relatively generous level and duration of 
Unemployment Benefits.  
As expected, in the long term when the entitlement to Unemployment Benefits is exhausted 
for all new unemployed, household income falls much more consistently within a range 
between 40% (Italy) and 57% (UK) of its pre-unemployment level. Interestingly, in this 
scenario the country with the highest Net Replacement Rate is the UK with an average value 
equal to that for those entitled to Unemployment Benefits in the short term. The UK Net 
Replacement Rate is also highest in the long term for the sub-group of new unemployed who 
live in households with no other people with earnings (“Sole  earner  households”  in  Table  4). 
These are the likely to be among the new unemployed to experience large reductions in 
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income and low incomes in the long term. In all countries considered the Net Replacement 
Rate is lower for this sub-group than for the new unemployed as a whole, strikingly so for 
Italy.   
In the long term, the Net Replacement Rates show higher dispersion in the countries where a 
substantial share of the new unemployed are left with very low or null incomes. The kernel 
density functions presented in Figure 2 show that this is particularly true in Italy due to the 
absence of Social Assistance Benefits and in the Netherlands where homeowners are 
generally not entitled to the Social Assistance. 
< FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE> 
The protective role played by Original Income (including earnings of other household 
members) is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the Net Replacement Rates by its 
components (with Taxes and Contributions reducing the Replacement Rates and hence 
appearing with the negative sign). Income from other non-work related Benefits (i.e. mainly 
pensions and disability benefits) received plays a similar but smaller role. In the short term, 
the sum of these two components for those entitled to Unemployment Benefits, before the 
deduction of taxes and contributions, makes up around 70% of post-shock household income 
in Italy and the UK, 60% in Estonia and the Netherlands, 53% in Spain and around 44% in 
Belgium (figures given by the ratio between each component of the bars in Figure 3 and the 
Net Replacement Rate.) These figures are even larger for those not entitled to Unemployment 
Benefits and considering the situation of all new unemployed in the long term. From Figure 
3, it is clear that a substantial part of the cushioning effect on household income is 
attributable to the market incomes of other household members (white bar) and to public 
transfers (i.e. mainly pensions, grey bar, in all countries but the UK) which are not primarily 
designed as automatic stabilisers or as protective safety nets in case of an unemployment 
shock. Moreover, given that earnings of other household members are progressively more 
important as household income increases, the average Net Replacement Rates are likely to be 
pushed up by the presence of these incomes at the top of the income distribution and this is 
only partly compensated by progressive income tax. 
When we consider those entitled to Unemployment Benefits, it emerges that these play a 
large role in Belgium (63% of post-unemployment household income), the Netherlands 
(67%) and Spain (55%). In Italy and Estonia they make up around 40% of post-
unemployment household income. In the UK the contributory Unemployment Benefit 
contributes to only 11% of the post-unemployment income while Social Assistance makes up 
24% of it.  
In each of the scenarios Family Benefits play an important role in those countries where they 
are relatively generous and, at least partly, income based and hence responsive to the income 
shock due to the loss of a job in the household: in Belgium, Estonia, Netherlands and, above 
all the UK. In the latter case the Working Tax Credit (included  in  “Family  Benefits”)  has  an  
important cushioning effect on household income when only one earner is left in the family 
who is then entitled to the Credit. 
Across countries, with the only exception of Italy where there is no general income support 
scheme, Social Assistance on average is a significant top up to incomes for those not entitled 
to Unemployment Benefits and for the new unemployed in the long term scenario.   
The general lesson of this analysis is that it is necessary to look at the social protection 
system as a whole and how it interacts with household composition and incomes received by 
other household members. Focusing exclusively on Unemployment Benefits is not sufficient. 
<FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE> 
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In the short term the average net public contribution to the disposable income as proportion 
of the net earning lost due to unemployment (Table 5) ranges from 30% in the UK to 74% in 
Belgium for those entitled to Unemployment Benefits and from 2% in Italy to 26% in the UK 
for those not entitled. As expected, the average Compensation Rate is usually much lower for 
those not entitled to Unemployment Benefits than for those entitled, with two extreme 
situations that are of interest. First, the lowest value is achieved in Italy where the 
Compensation Rate is close to zero given the absence of general Social Assistance schemes 
and the only source of income support being channelled through limited family based tax 
concessions, which are inversely related to the income of the main earner. Secondly, the 
highest value is observed in the UK where the Compensation Rate for those not entitled to 
Unemployment Benefits is very similar to that faced by those entitled to Unemployment 
Benefits. This illustrates how the British contributory Unemployment Benefit does not offer 
protection that is as generous as in other countries and at the same time, the level of 
protection offered by the Social Assistance benefits is on average greater than in other 
countries. Such evidence raises the issue whether the tax-benefit system should guarantee a 
reasonable minimum level of protection for all potentially unemployed people or 
alternatively should ensure the relative income maintenance for a smaller (and generally 
higher income) group.13 
In the long term, when the new unemployed have exhausted their entitlement to 
Unemployment Benefits, the average Compensation Rate is usually very similar to that faced 
by those not entitled to Unemployment Benefits in the short term. The main exceptions are 
Belgium and Estonia where there are effects due to the composition of the group not entitled 
to Unemployment Benefits which act in opposite directions. In Estonia, those not entitled to 
Unemployment Benefits are less attached to the labour market and have low household 
incomes (confirmed by their high poverty risk when in work as shown in Table 6) and hence 
are more likely to be entitled to Social Assistance Benefits than the new unemployed as a 
whole. In Belgium the opposite is true: those not covered by the generous Unemployment 
Benefit protection system are usually young and temporary workers and the level of their 
family income (e.g. from the earnings and pensions of their parents) prevents them from 
being entitled to Social Assistance.   
In the long term, the comparison of the Compensation Rate between the new unemployed as 
a whole and those living in sole earner households reveals that the average net public support 
is higher for sole earner households in all countries with the exception of Italy, highlighting 
the extent to which public support is targeted at those without other resources. This seems to 
be particularly true where the bulk of public support comes from means-tested Social 
Assistance. This is the case of Belgium and the UK where the net public transfer is 13 
percentage points higher for sole earner households than for the new unemployed as a whole.  
<TABLE 5 AROUND HERE> 
Figure 4 reports the average Compensation Rate by its components showing that in the short 
term most public support is channelled through Unemployment Benefits (bar with forward 
sloping grey lines) for those entitled to them. It is important to note that in the Netherlands 
and, to lesser extent in Spain, the income tax (bar with backward sloping black lines) payable 
on these benefits reduces their effect in a non-negligible way. In other countries specific tax 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the UK system does not guarantee the average level of protection shown by our 
results. These assume complete take-up of means-tested benefits (included in Social Assistance and Family 
Benefits) and hence show the intended amount of insurance coverage embedded in the existing tax-benefit 
systems.  
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credits for replacement income (Belgium) or general tax allowances make the taxes on 
Unemployment Benefits tiny. In the UK, Social Assistance (black bar) makes up the largest 
share of public support even when the contributory Unemployment Benefit is payable while 
in all countries, except Italy, it is a much smaller but important source of compensation for 
those not entitled to Unemployment Benefits and for the new unemployed in the long term.  
<FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE> 
The role of Social Assistance and the extent to which public support is targeted at the bottom 
of the distribution is made explicit by looking at the average Compensation Rate by 
household income quintile group for those entitled to Unemployment Benefits in the short 
term (Figure 5). The most striking pattern is observed in the UK: due to Social Assistance 
(black bar), and the decreasing effect of the contributory Unemployment Benefit (bar with 
forward sloping grey lines) the Compensation Rate shows a decreasing pattern from a 57% 
for the new unemployed from the first quintile group to 14% for those at the top of the 
income distribution. It is also clear that the cushioning role played by Family Benefits (bar 
with dots), mainly the means-tested Child Tax Credit and the in-work benefit Working Tax 
Credit). On the one hand, from the second quintile on, increases in these benefits contribute 
to a higher Compensation Rate (and in particular the presence of someone still working in the 
household may trigger entitlement to Working Tax Credit). On the other hand, at the very 
bottom of the distribution, households where the only earner becomes unemployed lose their 
entitlement to the Working Tax Credit contributing to a lower Compensation Rate. 
In the other countries, the average Compensation Rate decreases with income quintile but to a 
lesser extent than in the UK. Social Assistance emerges as a component of public support for 
those at the bottom of the income distribution in Belgium, Estonia, Spain, and, above all, the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the role of income tax paid on Unemployment Benefits in reducing 
the overall Compensation Rate is not negligible in the Netherlands nor for those at the top of 
the income distribution in Belgium, Estonia and Spain.  
<FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE> 
 
5.2. Absolute resilience  
The extent to which the tax-benefit instruments allow the new unemployed to avoid falling 
below a given level of income depends on the generosity of the system, entitlement to receive 
Unemployment Benefits, the income position of the new unemployed before becoming 
unemployed and their household circumstances. 
Table 6 shows the proportion of new unemployed individuals with household equivalised 
incomes below the poverty threshold  before  unemployment   (“Poor   in  work”),   those   falling  
below the threshold as a result   of   becoming   unemployed   (“At   risk”)   and   those   remaining  
above   in   spite   of   unemployment   (“Protected”).   It   shows   the   situation   for   all   the   new  
unemployed in the short term (by their Unemployment Benefits entitlement status) and in the 
long term, distinguishing between all households and sole earner households.  
Among those entitled to Unemployment Benefits, the share of those at risk of poverty before 
unemployment ranges from around 2-4% in the Netherlands, the UK, and in Belgium to 
much higher levels in Spain, Italy and Estonia (around 9-12%). Among the new unemployed 
entitled to Unemployed Benefits, in the UK 44% are at risk of falling below the poverty 
threshold on becoming unemployed. The percentages for the other countries are 30% in Italy, 
27% in Estonia, 18% in the Netherlands, 17% in Spain and 11% in Belgium. 
<TABLE 6 AROUND HERE> 
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The new unemployed not entitled to the Unemployment Benefits are, on average, from a 
poorer background: as already mentioned, these individuals are less attached to the labour 
market, with a shorter contributory history and lower salaries which result in a relatively low 
household income. They face a poverty risk, when still at work, at least double that for the 
new unemployed entitled to Unemployment Benefits, with a risk of poverty particularly high 
in Estonia (36%). When they become unemployed the share of those who remain protected 
(around 45% in Estonia, and Italy; around 60% in the other countries) is lower than the 
corresponding share of those entitled to Unemployment Benefits, except in the UK where it is 
higher. This is explained on the one hand by the fact that, as we have seen Unemployment 
Benefits make little difference to the average level of protection in the UK. On the other 
hand, again, the composition of the non-entitled group is such that other household incomes 
(earnings of partners of women, or parents of young people, with low labour market 
attachment) have a protective effect.  
As expected, the situation is even worse in the long term scenario when Unemployment 
Benefits are exhausted. Less than half new unemployed are protected from poverty, with 
larger shares of people at risk of poverty than in the short term in all countries (except in the 
UK). However, it is when looking at the sole earners that the dramatic share of those 
inadequately protected by the welfare system becomes clear: in Estonia only 4% of the new 
unemployed receive enough public support to stay above the poverty threshold, and around 
12%-14% in Belgium, Spain and Italy. In the Netherlands and the UK, the Social Assistance 
schemes allow up to 21% and 26%, respectively, of the new unemployed to stay above the 
poverty threshold.  
Looking at poverty risk faced by the unemployed as a whole in the long term, the share of 
new unemployed already poor when they were still in work resembles the overall pattern of 
in-work poverty (Ponthieux, 2010). The main exceptions are Estonia where the new 
unemployed face a risk of poverty before unemployment higher than the risk faced by the in 
work population as a whole and the UK where the opposite is true. Overall, it seems that in 
Europe the poor do not bear a disproportionate share of the losses – at least in terms of 
unemployment shock at the onset of the Great Recession – as it was the case in the 1990-1 
recession in the USA (Cutler and Katz, 1991).  
However, the share of the new unemployed not protected from poverty by the welfare 
systems, in particular when Unemployment Benefits are exhausted, supports Cantillon’s  view  
(2011) that social protection for working age individuals in Europe has become less adequate 
and social redistribution less pro-poor. Social Assistance schemes are not adequate to stop 
those losing their job from descending into poverty (Figari et al., 2013). 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have analysed the extent to which tax-benefit systems provide an automatic stabilisation 
of income for those who became unemployed at the onset of the Great Recession. The focus 
of the analysis is on the compensation for earnings lost due to unemployment which is 
channelled through the welfare systems to this group of people who are clearly vulnerable to 
the  recession’s  adverse  effects.  In order to assess the impact of unemployment on household 
income, counterfactual scenarios are simulated by using EUROMOD, the EU-wide 
microsimulation model, integrated with information from the EU-LFS data.  
The consequences of the economic downturn for the household income of unemployed 
individuals depend on the interaction between their contribution history, their living 
arrangements and the capacity of the tax-benefit systems to absorb macro-economic shocks. 
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The European countries included in our paper have systems of social protection for the 
unemployed that differ considerably, ranging from generous earnings related benefits to flat 
rate low level amounts. As a consequence the degree of protection offered to the unemployed 
differs. 
Our analysis reveals the need to look at the social protection system as a whole highlighting 
the role for adequate minimum income schemes alongside Unemployment Benefits. 
In the short term, individuals entitled to Unemployment Benefits face the highest average 
level of protection in countries characterised by generous and long lasting earnings-related 
Unemployment Benefits like Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands. At the other extreme, in 
the UK the flat rate Unemployment Benefit payable for at most 6 months offers the lowest 
level of replacement rate. Individuals not entitled to Unemployment Benefits and all 
unemployed in the long term face a much higher risk of falling below the poverty threshold, 
in particular in countries with less developed Social Assistance, such as Italy. The evidence 
presented here suggests that the current crisis will put minimum income schemes in several 
EU countries to a severe test. To meet the challenge, social safety nets must become stronger 
and tighter (Figari et al., 2013). 
In a cross country perspective, such  evidence raises the issue whether the tax-benefit system 
should ensure a minimum level of living standards for all individuals potentially at risk of 
unemployment or alternatively should ensure a higher stabilization of income for the sub-
group that is more attached to the labour market with a longer contributory history and 
permanent employment contracts. 
Our analysis has demonstrated the importance of the income of other household members in 
determining the economic resilience of the unemployed in the Great Recession. The sharing 
of risks within the household can be seen in general terms as a complement to the insurance 
function of the Welfare State. We have shown that it is those without either source of 
protection who are most at risk. However, as is usual in distributive analysis, we have 
assumed complete income pooling within the household. The possibility that incomes are not 
in fact pooled serves to remind us of the non-equivalence of income received as 
Unemployment Benefit as an individual entitlement on the one hand, and income from Social 
Assistance, usually assessed on the economic situation of the family as a whole, on the other.  
The household pooling assumption is particularly important when the concern is with the 
young unemployed who represent almost half of the new unemployed across countries and 
just slightly less in Estonia and Italy. Depending on their family circumstances, educational 
attainments and career prospects the young unemployed can be the most vulnerable and 
deserve particular attention. The extent to which their incomes are cushioned can influence 
major life decisions such as  leaving the parental home (Iacovou, 2010) or sharing housing 
(Mykyta and Macartney, 2010) and have an impact on future household formation (Painter, 
2010). On the one hand, if they live in the parental home their earnings, lost due to 
unemployment, represent a secondary income source (because of other earnings or pensions 
received by their parents). In that case the household acts as an effective income stabilizer 
only if income is shared. On the other hand, if they do not live in the parental home, the 
generally lower absolute level of their incomes implies greater compensation by means-tested 
benefits and also a lower share of young new unemployed that are protected from the risk of 
poverty, making them particularly vulnerable.  
Finally, we believe that the stress test approach applied to tax-benefit schemes in a cross country perspective offers some potential opportunities for further research. In particular it 
could contribute to the growing literature on the measurement of the economic aspects of 
19 
 
well-being (Stiglitz et al., 2009). The approach presented in this paper could be applied to 
calculate the “risk of unemployment” component of the Economic Security domain of the 
Index of Economic Well-Being (Osberg and Sharpe, 2005). The stress test approach based on 
EUROMOD would allow one to derive the component of the index considering the 
heterogeneity of individual situations in a large number of countries, by capturing and 
weighting appropriately the individual risk of a job loss, the personal entitlement to 
Unemployment Benefits and the household level of replacement income that could be 
expected from the welfare system (Osberg and Sharpe, 2009).   
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the new unemployed 
  Belgium Estonia Spain Italy Netherlands UK 
Sample size (unweighted) 2,647 2,410 7,260 8,182 6,172 11,934 
Sample size (weighted) 110,194 49,389 1,670,376 469,277 143,851 1,050,124 
Individual characteristics             
Male % 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.68 
Age groups  %             
    < 35 0.49 0.38 0.46 0.41 0.47 0.47 
    35-44 0.29 0.27** 0.32 0.35 0.25 0.25 
    45-54 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.16 
    55+ 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.12 
Education level %             
    Lower secondary 0.33 0.13** 0.57 0.45 0.37 0.60 
    Upper secondary 0.41 0.60 0.23 0.44 0.36 0.19 
    Tertiary 0.25 0.27 0.20* 0.11 0.27 0.21 
Previous job             
Self-employed % 0.04** 0.02*** 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.09 
Sector of activity %             
    Agriculture 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.04* 0.02** 0.01** 0.01 
    Industry 0.22 0.36 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.47 
    Construction 0.12 0.22 0.30** 0.17 0.05**   
    Services 0.66 0.40 0.51** 0.55 0.81** 0.52 
Household characteristics             
Number of adults %             
    1 0.33 0.17*** 0.07** 0.15 0.30 0.24 
    2+ 0.67 0.83*** 0.93** 0.85 0.70 0.76 
Presence of children % 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.41 0.40 0.43 
Number of earners %             
    1 0.50 0.33* 0.30 0.40 0.42 0.40 
    2+ 0.50 0.67* 0.70 0.60 0.58 0.60 
With other new unemployed 
in the household % 
            
0.05 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Notes: Summary statistics for the new unemployed identified in EUROMOD data, by means of Coarsened Exact 
Matching. New unemployed are individuals who became unemployed between 2008 and 2009. * indicates mean 
value of the observed characteristics in EUROMOD data statistically different from the mean value in EU-LFS 
data at 10% level; ** 5%, *** 1%. Source: EUROMOD version F4.23. 
 
Table 2. New unemployed by household income quintile group  
 Belgium Estonia Spain Italy Netherlands UK 
Bottom 15.02   15.30   12.63   12.98   8.62   9.34   
2nd 19.02   15.87   19.98   17.37   16.46   17.40   
3rd 23.49   22.70   23.99   22.07   23.35   22.58   
4th 21.78   26.03   23.49   25.26   26.27   24.64   
Top 20.69   20.10   19.90   22.32   25.30   26.04   
Notes: Summary statistics for the new unemployed identified in EUROMOD data. Quintile groups based 
on household equivalised disposable income in the baseline (before the unemployment shock). Source: 
EUROMOD version F4.23. 
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Table 3. Unemployment Benefits (UBs) and Social Assistance schemes at June 30th, 2009   
 
  Schemes Typology / name Contributions conditions Payment rate Duration 
(months) 
Subject to 
Tax and SICs? 
BE UB Insurance Earnings-related benefit (flat 
rate for youths); amount 
depends on family situation 
Between 45 weeks in 18 
months and 89 weeks in 3 
years 
Single persons: 60% (from 2nd year 
53%). Cohabitants without dependants: 
58% (from 2nd year 40%) 
Lower and upper ceilings 
Unlimited Tax 
  Social Assistance Minimex  Based on means test  Unlimited   
EE UB Insurance Earnings-related benefit 12 months in 3 years 50% for 1st 100 days; afterwards 40%. 
Lower and upper ceilings 
9  Tax and 
Credited SICs 
 UB Assistance Flat rate (formally income-
based) 
6 months in 1 year €  64  per  month 9 (+ 5 until 
retirement) 
 
  Social Assistance Toimetulekutoetus   Based on means test Unlimited   
ES UB Insurance Earnings-related benefit; amount 
depends on family situation 
12 months in 6 years 70% for 1st 6 months; afterwards 60%. 
Lower and upper ceilings 
4 -24 Tax, SICs and 
Credited SICs  
 UB Assistance Flat-rate benefit  (Subsidio por 
desempleo), income-based 
3 months (1+ dependants) or 
6 months (No dependants) 
From  80%  of  the  “Public  Income  Rate  
of  Multiple  Effects”  (No  dependants)  
to 133% (3+ dependants) 
6 - 18   Tax 
  Social Assistance  Ingreso mínimo de inserción    Based on means test 6 - unlimited   
IT UB Insurance Earnings-related benefit* 52 weeks in 2 years 60% (for 1st 6 months, 50% for month 
7 and 8 and 40% for the rest) 
Upper ceiling 
8 (12 if aged 
50+) 
Tax and 
Credited SICs 
NL UB Insurance Earnings-related benefits 
(General and Extended benefits) 
General: 26 weeks in last 36 
weeks. 
Extended: 26 weeks in last 
36 weeks and at least 52 days 
in 4 of last 5 years 
General: 70%. 
Lower and upper ceilings 
Extended: 70% (75% for 1st 2 months) 
Upper ceiling 
Gen.: 3  
Ext.: 6-38  
Tax and SICs 
 
 UB Assistance Toeslagenwet, income-based  Based on means test Same as UB 
insurance 
Tax and SICs 
 Social Assistance Bijstand  Based on means test Unlimited Tax and SICs 
UK UB Insurance Flat rate benefit (Contributory 
Jobseekers’  Allowance - JSA) 
1 of last 2 years, with 
minimum level 
From  €  60  to  €  76  per  week 6 Tax 
 UB Assistance Jobseekers' Allowance (JSA)  Based on means test Unlimited  
 Social Assistance Income support    Based on means test Unlimited  
Notes: SICs: Social Insurance contributions paid by the unemployed. Credited contributions are paid by the social security agency on the Unemployment Benefit. * Special schemes 
in the Construction sector and the wage supplementation schemes (CIGs) are not simulated in EUROMOD. Source: MISSOC (2009) and EUROMOD country reports 
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Table 4. Average Net Replacement Rates in the short and long term, by Unemployment 
Benefits (UBs) entitlement status 
    Belgium Estonia Spain Italy Netherlands UK 
Short term Entitled to UBs 0.81 0.64 0.77 0.65 0.72 0.57 
  Not entitled to UBs 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.47 0.78 0.64 
Long term All new unemployed 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.48 0.57 
 Sole earner households 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.16 0.32 0.52 
Notes: Net Replacement Rate is the ratio of household disposable income after and before the unemployment 
shock. Source: EUROMOD version F4.23. 
 
 
Table 5. Average Compensation Rates in the short and long term, by Unemployment Benefits 
(UBs) entitlement status 
    Belgium Estonia Spain Italy Netherlands UK 
Short term Entitled to UBs 0.74 0.40 0.62 0.45 0.62 0.30 
  Not entitled to UBs 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.22 0.26 
Long term All new unemployed 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.20 0.26 
 Sole earner households 0.35 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.39 
Notes: Compensation Rate is the proportion of household disposable income lost due to unemployment that is 
compensated by public transfers. Source: EUROMOD version F4.23. 
 
 
Table 6. Poverty status of the new unemployed in the short and long term, by Unemployment 
Benefits (UBs) entitlement status 
    Belgium Estonia Spain Italy Netherlands UK 
Short term               
Entitled to UB Poor in work 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.03 
  At risk 0.11 0.27 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.44 
  Protected 0.85 0.61 0.74 0.61 0.80 0.52 
Not Entitled Poor in work 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.08 
  At risk 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.36 0.22 0.34 
  Protected 0.63 0.45 0.62 0.46 0.65 0.58 
Long term               
All households Poor in work 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 
  At risk 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.45 0.50 0.46 
  Protected 0.44 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.50 
Sole earner 
households Poor in work 0.09 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.09 
  At risk 0.78 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.66 
  Protected 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.26 
Notes: The poverty threshold is fixed at 60% of baseline median household disposable equivalised income. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.23. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Net Replacement Rates in the short term, new unemployed entitled 
to Unemployment Benefits 
 
Notes: The continuous vertical line is the Average Net Replacement Rate. The dashed vertical lines represent 
respectively the 25th and 75th percentile of the Net Replacement Rate distribution. See Table 4. Source: 
EUROMOD version F4.23. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Net Replacement Rates in the long term, all new unemployed  
 
Notes: See Figure 1. Source: EUROMOD version F4.23. 
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Figure 3. Decomposition (by income source) of average Net Replacement Rates in the short 
and long term, by Unemployment Benefits entitlement status. 
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Figure 4. Decomposition (by income source) of average Compensation Rates in the short and 
long term, by Unemployment Benefits entitlement status 
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Figure 5. Decomposition (by income sources) of average Compensation Rates for those entitled to Unemployment Benefits 
by household income quintile groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: See Figure 2. Quintile groups based on disposable income before becoming unemployed. Source: EUROMOD version F4.23. 
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